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Employment constitutes a critical link between economic growth and poverty reduction. A growth process that generates more employment, especially at the lower end of the wage distribution, would be more conducive to poverty reduction, all else remaining the same. The features of the growth process that are especially relevant in this regard are the rate of growth of output and the employment intensity of the production process, which together determine the employment generating potential of a growth process. This paper examines the conceptual linkages among output growth, employment growth and poverty, proposes a methodology for decomposing employment growth into output effect and intensity effect, and demonstrates the usefulness of the decomposition analysis by applying it to the recent experience of manufacturing employment in some major Asian countries.

The Asian countries have differed greatly in their ability to absorb labour in the manufacturing sector over the last few decades. In countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia labour absorption has occurred at a rapid pace, whereas in countries such as India and the Philippines the rate of absorption has been low. Furthermore, the manufacturing sector of some countries has displayed a complete reversal in its ability to absorb labour over time. The prime example is China, where a very high rate of absorption in the 1980s turned into a very low rate in the 1990s. It is important to understand the reasons for these differences across countries and over time in order to inform policy-making for employment-intensive growth.

The reasons for these differences can be analysed at different levels. At the most proximate level, one can undertake what might be called an accounting analysis. At this level, the analysis focuses on certain accounting relationships, which can provide interesting clues for a deeper causal analysis. The most obvious accounting relationship is the one which says that any observed change in employment growth can be ascribed in part to growth of output and in part to any change in the rate at which employment responds to a given change in output. The latter part is described by the concept of employment elasticity of growth – a concept that will figure prominently in this paper. 

The elasticity of employment can itself be seen as depending on two constituent factors. One of them is the composition of output, which can affect the elasticity because some activities are more labour-intensive than others. The second factor is the choice of technique adopted by different activities. To the extent that there exists possibility of substitution between factors of production, a firm may adopt more or less labour-intensive techniques depending on the relative profitability of alternative techniques. If the firms choose to adopt more labour-intensive techniques, the elasticity of employment will be higher, other things remaining the same. The opposite will happen if they choose to adopt less labour-intensive techniques.

The accounting analysis can thus be conducted in two parts. In the first part, the observed employment growth is decomposed into an ‘output effect’ and an ‘elasticity effect’. In the second part, the ‘elasticity effect’ can itself be decomposed into a ‘composition effect’ and a ‘choice of technique’ effect. Such accounting analyses do not obviously constitute a complete economic analysis of why employment may have grown faster or slower in particular cases. They may, however, facilitate a proper economic analysis by directing the analyst’s attention to potentially fruitful lines of enquiry. The present paper, however, confines itself mainly to the accounting analysis, supported by a limited causal analysis.

The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II explores certain conceptual issues involved in interpreting the employment intensity of manufacturing growth as an indicator of its poverty-reducing potential. Section III develops a decomposition framework (a) to break up employment growth into two parts – the part explained by growth in output (the ‘output effect’) and the part explained by change in the employment elasticity of growth (the ‘elasticity effect’), and (b) to break up the change in employment elasticity itself into two parts – the part explained by change in the composition of output (the ‘composition effect’) and the part explained by change in the techniques of production (the ‘choice of technique’ effect). Section IV applies the decomposition framework to a number of Asian countries, using industrial data at the 3-digit level of classification provided by the UNIDO database. This section also contains a brief discussion of a few country experiences in order to illustrate the value of the kind of decomposition analyses undertaken in this paper. Finally, Section VI offers some concluding remarks.


II. Elasticity, Productivity and Poverty: Some Conceptual Issues






The most misleading elasticity estimates are those that are calculated for the economy as a whole. Many studies have calculated such economy-wide elasticities by relating overall employment growth with overall GDP growth and interpreted the observed change in elasticity for the purpose of drawing inference on whether the growth process has been employment-friendly or not. There are serious methodological problems with this approach.

First, if one wants to deduce whether a particular growth process has been employment-friendly or not, ideally one should look for the evidence on the ‘demand for labour’ generated by the growth process. The relevant elasticity concept would thus be the percentage change in the demand for labour created by one per cent change in output, holding other things constant. Most important among those other things is the supply of labour. The extent to which employment actually changes with growth depends on both the demand for and supply of labour. The effect of supply must be separated out if any inference is to be drawn about the employment-generating power of the growth process. Technically speaking, what we need is a ‘structural’ estimate of elasticity indicating only the demand for labour, as opposed to a ‘reduced form’ estimate which reflects the combined effects of supply and demand. The overall employment elasticity that is calculated by relating observed employment growth with observed GDP growth are precisely such ‘reduced form’ estimates that confound the effects of supply and demand. Suppose the growth processes in two economies are exactly similar and that they generate exactly the same demand for labour but the supply of labour grows faster in economy A than in economy B, resulting in lower wages in A (relative to B) through the interaction of supply and demand. Insofar as lower wages encourage the employers to employ more labour, all else remaining the same, the overall employment elasticity may well be higher for A, but this will reveal nothing about the relative employment-friendliness of the growth process in the two countries.​[2]​

A special case of this problem occurs in the presence of surplus labour. It is well-known that poor people can hardly afford to remain unemployed in labour-surplus economies that have no formal social security systems. When they enter the labour force but fail to find adequately remunerative jobs (which exist mostly in the small formal sector of the economy), they do not remain completely idle. Instead, they get absorbed in the informal sector on the basis of work-sharing arrangements and part-time employment. Such people may be seriously underemployed, as measured by the intensity or hours of work, but the typical labour force surveys will still count them as employed. This means that any change in labour force gets almost fully reflected in a corresponding change in employment figures. In other words, in the presence of surplus labour, employment growth almost entirely reflects changes in the supply side, not even the interaction between supply and demand, as in the general case discussed above. What the interaction between demand and supply determines in this case is the rate of underemployment, but the overall employment level is determined almost wholly by the supply side. Thus if the growth of employment falls, it will typically mean nothing more than that the labour force has grown at a slower rate.






However, a case can be made that employment elasticity measured for specific sectors of the economy, especially the manufacturing sector, may yield useful information. In fact, the very existence of surplus labour that renders the economy-wide measures of elasticity useless as indicators of employment-intensity of growth can be said to render the employment elasticity of manufacturing growth a meaningful concept. In the presence of surplus labour, labour will be supplied elastically to the manufacturing sector – leading to a horizontal supply curve of labour as in the Lewis-type dual economy models. In that case, any change in manufacturing employment can be attributed entirely to the demand side effect.​[3]​  As a result, the employment elasticity of manufacturing growth can be meaningfully linked to the employment-generating power of the growth process (in the manufacturing sector).​[4]​ 

Nevertheless, a good deal of caution is still needed in interpreting this elasticity figure, in particular in interpreting any rise or fall of elasticity. A fall in elasticity is typically viewed as a sign of weakening of growth’s ability to generate employment. But this view can be misleading in some cases, even when we are confident that the fall in elasticity has been caused by purely demand side as opposed to supply side factors. The idea that falling elasticity reflects weakening of growth’s ability to generate employment is based on the following kind of reasoning. Given any rate of growth of output, it is mathematically true that a lower elasticity implies slower growth of employment. Therefore, if elasticity is found to have fallen over time, it is tempting to argue that, given the observed rate of growth of output, employment growth would have been higher if elasticity had not fallen. In that sense, falling elasticity does seem to indicate weakening of growth’s ability to generate employment.

However, this line of reasoning is only correct if the elasticity and the growth of output can be taken to be independent of each other. Only then does it make sense to consider what would have happened if elasticity had not changed along with the change in the growth of output. If, in contrast, elasticity happens to depend on the rate of output growth (or vice versa), then it makes no sense to do so.

There are indeed good reasons to suspect that elasticity of employment may not be independent of the growth of output. The main reason is that elasticity depends on the growth of labour productivity, and there is a rich tradition in the literature on industrial growth which suggests that labour productivity in turn depends on the rate of manufacturing growth. Elasticity is thus linked to output growth through productivity. A celebrated relationship between growth of output and productivity goes under the name of Verdoorn’s law, which says that faster growth of output leads to faster growth of labour productivity in the manufacturing sector.​[5]​ The economic logic behind this relationship lies in the proposition that as output grows faster labour productivity also grows faster because of economies of scale, learning by doing and the benefits of division of labour and increased specialisation that are often associated with faster growth. If labour productivity thus responds to the growth of output, then it can be easily seen that elasticity of employment cannot be independent of the rate of growth of output.

Consider the identity, Y = E  Y/E, which says that output (Y) is a product of employment (E) and average labour productivity (Y/E). Denoting productivity by P, we can rewrite the identity as Y = E  P. Using lower case letters to indicate the rate of growth of a given variable, the above identity can be written in the growth form as 

	y = e + p    	  e = y – p				(1)

Elasticity of employment with respect to output is given by  = e/y. Using (1), we get

	 = e/y = 1 – p/y					(2)

It is obvious from (2) that when y changes, what will happen to  depends very much on what happens to p. Verdoorn’s law states that higher y leads to higher p. Suppose, the effect of Verdoorn’s law is so strong that when y rises p rises proportionately more. In that case, the ratio p/y will rise and the value of  will fall. On the contrary, if p rises proportionately less than y, elasticity will increase. In either case, the value of elasticity is dependent on the rate of growth of output.

In this situation, it could be grossly misleading to draw inference about the employment-generating power of the growth process from the value of elasticity alone. This can be explained through a numerical example. Suppose an economy is characterised by the following values of y, p and e in period 1: (y = 4, p =1, e =3). In period 2, the growth of manufacturing output accelerates and so does the growth of labour productivity following Verdoorn’s law, resulting in the following set of values (y = 6, p= 2, e = 4). Elasticity of employment ( = e/y) would then fall from 0.75 in period 1 to 0.67 in period 2. 

Note that although elasticity has fallen, employment is actually growing faster in period 2. The usual interpretation of this scenario would be that employment is growing faster only because output is growing faster but the nature of growth has become unfavourable to employment generation as indicated by falling elasticity. It would be argued, for example, that employment would have grown even faster in the second period had elasticity not fallen. This line of argument would be misleading, however. It is true that if elasticity had remained unchanged at 0.75, then with the given rate of output growth of 6 per cent, employment would have grown even faster in period 2 (at the rate of 4.5 per cent instead of 4 per cent). But the problem with this argument is that it involves an invalid kind of counterfactual comparison. The fact is that with the given rate of output growth of 6 per cent there is no way elasticity would have remained unchanged, because of the boost to labour productivity given by accelerated growth of output. In other words, Verdoorn’s law ensures that the combination (y = 6,  = 0.67) comes as a package and one cannot postulate a counterfactual where output growth of 6 per cent is combined with elasticity of 0.75 unless it can be shown that the combination (y = 6,  = 0.75) is also feasible. But in the scenario we have described this alternative package is simply not available, so it makes no sense to compare the actual situation in period 2 with this infeasible counterfactual.

To be valid, counterfactual comparisons must be made only with feasible alternatives. Suppose that apart from the situation prevailing in period 1 the only other feasible scenario in which elasticity would have remained unchanged at 0.75 is given by the combination (y = 5, p = 1.25, e = 3.75). Verdoorn’s law still operates in this scenario. Compared to period 1, output growth has accelerated in this scenario and so has productivity growth, but in such a way that elasticity has remained unchanged. By comparing this counterfactual with the actual situation in period 2, we can now check what would have happened if elasticity had remained unchanged. Clearly, employment would have grown slower (3.75 per cent instead of 4). We thus see that lower elasticity in period 2 is associated with faster employment growth compared to any other feasible scenario in which elasticity remains unchanged. Falling elasticity in this example cannot, therefore, be seen as evidence of weakening of growth’s ability to generate employment.

The general point is that when elasticity itself depends on the growth of output (through the effect of growth on productivity), counterfactual comparisons made on the condition ‘if elasticity had remained unchanged at the new growth rate’ is not a meaningful exercise. In this case, elasticity on its own cannot be expected to shed any light on the employment-generating power of the growth process. For that, one must look at the totality of the growth process and compare its employment-generating power with feasible alternatives.

There are a couple of other considerations that must also be borne in mind while interpreting employment elasticity in the manufacturing sector. First, elasticity can only be taken as a useful indicator of the employment-generating power of manufacturing if surplus labour exists, so that the assumption of horizontal supply curve of labour can be reasonably made. If, however, surplus labour gets exhausted and as a result the supply curve of labour begins to slope upwards, elasticity might mislead because the demand for labour generated by the growth process will not be reflected fully in employment. The effect of rising demand for labour will be split up partly into in employment growth and partly into wage growth. Exactly how the split occurs will depend on the process of wage formation – i.e., on the degree of competition in the labour market, on the role of trade unions, on the effect of minimum wage legislation, on efficiency wage considerations, and so on. If two episodes of manufacturing growth generate exactly the same demand for labour but they happen to differ in the process of wage formation, then their employment growth might also differ and so might the values of elasticity. But it will be a mistake to interpret the lower value of elasticity in this case as a weakness in the employment-intensity of growth, because the problem here lies solely in the process of wage formation and not in the nature of growth.

Secondly, a distinction needs to be made between nominal employment and effective employment. If the manufacturing sector of a country is characterised by redundant labour, which is not uncommon in the public sector of developing countries, the interpretation of elasticity will depend very much on whether the growth process happens to be accompanied by accumulation or shedding or maintenance of redundant labour. For instance, if redundant labour is being shed as part of some structural adjustment while manufacturing growth is creating new demand for employment, then it is quite possible that employment in terms of effective labour time might rise while nominal employment in terms of persons employed declines. The value of elasticity might decline in this case, measuring as it does nominal rather than effective employment owing to the nature of available data, but it would be a mistake to interpret the falling value as a weakness of the employment-generating power of the growth process. As we shall see in section IV, this distinction between effective and nominal employment has quite a bearing on how we interpret the experience of the two largest economies of Asia – India and China.


II.3 Elasticity and Employment-Friendliness of Growth: A Summary

The problems of interpretation discussed above can be summarised as follows. The first point to emphasize is that the economy-wide measures of elasticity (calculated by dividing the observed rate of employment growth by the observed rate of GDP growth) are not terribly illuminating as indicators of the employment-intensity of the growth process. Since these measures conflate the effects of demand for labour generated by the growth process with the supply of labour generated by population growth and labour force participation rate, they cannot shed much light on the employment-generating power of the growth process as such. In the special case where an economy is characterised by surplus labour, the measured elasticity would in fact reflect only the change in labour supply and provide no information whatsoever on the demand for labour generated by the growth process.

The second general point is that sectoral elasticities, especially the elasticity of manufacturing employment, can provide useful information on the employment-intensity of the growth process, but even in this case a great deal of caution is needed in interpreting the figures. Suppose we observe that the elasticity of employment has fallen in the manufacturing sector. The preceding discussion shows that there can be at least four distinct reasons why elasticity might have fallen.

1.	Growth of output has accelerated and the productivity of labour has grown so much as a result (Verdoorn’s law) that the elasticity of employment has fallen.

2.	The growth process has generated a strong demand for labour, but it has not resulted in a lot of new employment because the prevalent process of wage formation has allowed existing workers to take advantage of strong labour demand to secure for themselves higher wages, leaving little room for employment expansion.

3.	The growth process has generated a strong demand for labour and the process of wage formation has also allowed significant expansion of employment, but this has been accompanied by a process of structural adjustment that has led to the shedding of redundant labour that the public sector industries had historically been saddled with.

4.	The structure of incentives that has stimulated growth of output has also induced the employers to move towards relatively less labour-intensive production processes – either by shifting to the production of less labour-intensive commodities or by adopting less labour-intensive techniques in the production of the same commodity.

The interpretation of falling elasticity will be quite different in these four cases. In particular, whether we can justifiably interpret falling elasticity as an indicator of employment-unfriendly growth process depends very much on which of the four cases happens to be true.

In the first case, whether the growth process has been employment-friendly or not cannot be deduced by observing the elasticity figure alone. One will have to compare the observed rate of employment growth with a counterfactual that can be accepted as a feasible alternative scenario. In the second case, one may justifiably characterise the overall experience of the manufacturing sector as unfriendly to employment, but the growth process itself may not be so characterised because the reason for the weakness of employment lies in the process of wage formation and not in the nature of growth. In the third case, it is first necessary to ascertain what has happened to the growth of ‘effective’ employment as a net outcome of two opposing forces. If net effective employment is found to have increased, then the overall situation will have to be characterised as employment-friendly despite falling elasticity. If, on the other hand, net effective employment is found to have fallen or at least not to have grown, then the overall situation may be characterised as unfriendly to employment but the growth process itself may not be so characterised because the problem lies in the shedding of redundant labour and not in the nature of growth. Thus in none of the first three cases can falling elasticity of employment be readily interpreted as weakness in the employment-generating power of the growth process. Only in the last case can this interpretation be unambiguously made.


II.4 Elasticity and Poverty

If drawing implications about employment intensity of growth from observed values of elasticity is problematic, then drawing implications for poverty is even more so. The reason is that there is no firm relationship between poverty and the employment-intensity of growth as measured by elasticity. It is of course true that greater intensity of employment should generally be beneficial for the poor, other things remaining the same. But the problem is that elasticities are not typically measured by holding other things constant. As a result, neither does falling elasticity necessarily imply a negative effect on the poor nor does a rising elasticity always imply a positive effect on them. This proposition is elaborated below with reference to employment elasticity in the manufacturing sector.

Consider an economy that was previously labour surplus but has recently found the surplus exhausted and as a result the horizontal supply curve of labour has begun to rise upwards. Suppose also that the nature of manufacturing growth has remained unchanged in the sense that the demand for labour rises similarly in both regimes. The observed elasticity would almost certainly fall in the second regime as some part of the rising demand for labour will now be reflected in higher manufacturing wages and only a part will lead to higher employment, whereas previously the entire rise in demand was translated into employment growth. Does it mean the poor gain less in the second regime compared to the first? 

Not necessarily. The first thing to consider is the poverty status of the manufacturing workers i.e., whether they can be classified as poor or not, depending on whatever poverty line happens to be relevant in the specific context. If they are deemed to be poor, then the conclusion must be that the poor would have gained in both regimes, but in different ways. In the first regime, they would have gained wholly in terms of reduction of underemployment at a constant rate of wages; in the second regime they would have gained partly in terms of reduction of underemployment and partly in terms of higher wages.

Even if the manufacturing workers are deemed to be marginally non-poor, and all the poor people are known to belong to sectors outside manufacturing, it still does not follow that the poor would have gained less in the second regime. It is true that they would have gained less in terms of access to manufacturing employment in the second regime, but unlike in the first regime they might now gain in terms of higher wages. As exhaustion of surplus labour leads to rising wages in the manufacturing sector, it will also tend to pull up wages in the other sectors from which manufacturing will have to draw labour. As a result, even those who have failed to get access to manufacturing employment might still gain. 

Thus, irrespective of whether the manufacturing workers happen to belong to the poor category or not, falling elasticity cannot necessarily be interpreted as bad news for the poor. When the elasticity of employment falls as a result of exhaustion of surplus labour, all that happens is that the nature of gain changes for the poor – instead of gaining solely in terms of higher employment they now gain partly in terms of employment expansion and partly in terms of higher wages. The overall gain in welfare for the poor as a whole may of course differ in the two regimes, depending on who amongst the poor have gained from employment and who amongst them have gained from higher wages and who haven’t gained  at all i.e., on the distribution of gains among the poor. But by looking at the elasticity figure alone nothing can be divined about the way aggregate welfare of the poor has changed as a result of the change in the nature of gain.

Yet another case where falling elasticity has ambiguous implications for poverty is when redundant labour is being shed even as manufacturing growth is creating new employment opportunities. It was argued above that falling elasticity in this case cannot necessarily be interpreted as weakening of the employment-generating power of growth. By the same token, it can be argued that it cannot necessarily be interpreted as bad news for the poor either. Those amongst the poor who are availing of the new employment opportunities may well move out of poverty, while the workers who are being made redundant may not all fall into poverty as they might find remunerative work in the informal sector or might be protected by some form of social safety net. It is, therefore, quite possible that the overall positive impact of manufacturing growth on the poor may not weaken even when the elasticity of employment falls (in nominal terms). The point is not that this must happen, but that it might.​[6]​ That’s what makes the poverty implication of falling elasticity ambiguous in this case.

Consider now the opposite case where elasticity of employment rises in the manufacturing sector, but the poor do not necessarily gain more than before. Suppose the reason why elasticity has risen is that growth of manufacturing output has faltered but employment growth has not weakened pari passu as the employers have passed on the shock of faltering growth to the workers in the form of lower wages. The poor would have suffered in this case in terms of reduced wages, even though employment growth had remained as strong as before.

Examples of such apparently perverse possibilities can be multiplied. There is, however, nothing intrinsically perverse about them. They only appear so because it has become commonplace to equate rising elasticity of employment with favourable impact on the poor and falling elasticity with a negative impact. The preceding discussion shows that the relationship between employment elasticity and poverty is much more complex than that. The information on employment elasticity may still play a useful role in judging the impact of manufacturing growth on poverty, but it must be used in a much more nuanced manner than is commonly done and in conjunction with other information, pertaining especially to the forces underlying the change in elasticity. 


III. A Decomposition Framework

The first step in understanding the forces underlying the change in elasticity is to development an accounting framework within which different factors affecting employment growth can be fitted together in a coherent manner. For this purpose, a methodology is developed below for decomposing employment growth into its various components. It is a two-stage decomposition exercise. In the first stage, overall employment growth is decomposed into an output effect and an elasticity effect. The first effect captures the pure effect of output growth on employment growth and the second effect captures the effect of changes in overall labour-intensity of production on employment growth. In the second stage, the elasticity effect is itself decomposed into a choice of technique effect and a sectoral composition effect. The choice of technique effect refers to the change in the overall labour-intensity of production that occurs because of change in labour-intensity in individual sectors of production. The sectoral composition effect refers to the change in the overall labour-intensity of production that occurs because of change in the production structure i.e., reallocation of resources between sectors of varying degrees of labour-intensity.


III.1 Decomposing Employment Growth into Output Effect and Elasticity Effect

The amount by which the growth of employment changes from period to period can be thought of as being composed of two parts. The first part is simply the effect of growth of output – if output grows faster, employment is also expected to grow faster, other things remaining the same. The second part is the effect of changing labour-intensity of production as reflected in the concept of output elasticity of employment. The higher the value of elasticity, the higher should be the growth in employment, other things remaining the same. We may call these the ‘output effect’ and the ‘elasticity effect’ respectively. Formally, we may define these concepts as follows.

Output effect: The amount by which the rate of employment growth changes from one period to the next in response to change in the rate of output growth, assuming the elasticity of employment with respect to output to remain constant.

Elasticity effect: The amount by which the rate of employment growth changes from one period to the next in response to change in the elasticity of employment, assuming the rate of growth of output to remain the same.

We shall consider changes in employment and output between two periods of time, say, two decades such as the 1980s and 1990s, denoted by the subscripts 1 and 2 respectively.

Growth of output in period i 			= yi 	(i = 1, 2)
Growth of employment in period i 		= ei 	(i = 1, 2)
Output elasticity of employment in period i 	= I	(i = 1, 2)

The elasticities are defined as:

	1 = e1/y1; 	2 = e2/y2				 (3)

We want to decompose the change in employment growth, e2 – e1, into two parts – viz., the output effect and the elasticity effect. 

From definition (3), we get,

	e1 = 1y1 and e2= 2y2

So, 	e2 – e1	= 2y2 - 1y1 =  2y2 - 2y1 + 2y1 - 1y1
	
Or, 	e2 – e1	= 2(y2 – y1) + y1(2 - 1)			 (4)

Equation (4) provides the desired decomposition. The first part of the RHS of the equation shows the part of the change in employment growth that is explained by change in output growth (y2 – y1) at the given elasticity 2 – it is the ‘output effect’. The second part shows the part of the change in employment growth that is explained by change in elasticity (2 - 1) at the given rate of growth of output y1 – it is the elasticity effect.​[7]​

Thus,
	Output effect 		= 2(y2 – y1)			 (5a)




III.2 Decomposing Elasticity Effect into the Choice of Technique Effect and the Sectoral Composition Effect

The part of the change in employment growth that can be attributed to the elasticity effect can itself be thought of as being composed of two parts. Any change in the output elasticity of employment implies a corresponding change in the labour-intensity of production.​[8]​ Thus, if one finds that employment elasticity of the manufacturing sector has declined from one period to the next, it must be because the overall labour intensity has changed adversely for employment. Correspondingly, rising elasticity would indicate that overall labour-intensity has changed favourably for employment. But the overall labour-intensity of the manufacturing sector (or any other sector, for that matter) can itself change in two distinct ways. First, the composition of the manufacturing sector can change in such a way that the weight of more labour-intensive industries falls and the weight of less labour-intensive industries rises. The aggregate effect of such changes in the relative weights of industries with different degrees of labour-intensity may be called the ‘sectoral composition effect’. Secondly, within individual industries the choice of technique may change in such a way that less employment per unit of output is generated than before. The aggregate effect of these changes in labour-intensity within individual industries may be called the ‘choice of technique effect’.​[9]​

We would like to decompose the elasticity effect into these two components – viz. the sectoral composition effect and the choice of technique effect. The starting point of this decomposition exercise is to note the existence of a precise relationship between elasticity and labour intensity. Labour intensity is defined as employment generated per unit of output (E/Y). Let the growth in labour intensity in two periods be denoted by q1 and q2 respectively. It can be shown (see the Technical Appendix of Osmani, 2006) that for any given growth of output (y1), 

	y1(2  1) = q2  q1					(6)

Two points about this equation are worth noting. First, the equation can be used to make a clear statement about what has been happening to labour intensity when the elasticity of employment rises or falls. Suppose elasticity falls (2 < 1) and the given y is positive. In that case, equation (4) suggests that q2 < q1. This means either that labour intensity has been growing more slowly in the second period (if qi > 0) or that labour intensity has been falling faster in the second period (if qi < 0). In either case, labour intensity has changed adversely from the point of view of employment. Thus falling elasticity can be interpreted as an employment-averse change in the rate of change in labour intensity. Similarly, rising elasticity can be interpreted as an employment-friendly change in labour intensity.​[10]​

Second, it may be noted that the LHS of equation (6) is precisely the ‘elasticity effect’ as defined in (3b). Thus, this equation assures us that decomposing the output effect is the same thing as decomposing the change in the growth rates of labour intensity (q2  q1). On this basis we proceed to the second stage of decomposition by focussing on (q2  q1) rather than y1(2  1).​[11]​

Let labour-intensity at the beginning of period i be denoted by Li0 and at the end of the period by LiT. As before, E and Y stand for employment and output respectively.

We can define labour intensity at different points in time as follows,

	L10 = E10/Y10,    	L1T = E1T/Y1T,				(7)
	L20 = E20/Y20,    	L20 = E2T/Y2T
Then, the rates of growth in labour intensity are defined as

	  q2 = (L2T  L20)/ L20;  	q1 = L1T  L10.			(8)


Our task is to decompose the entity (q2 - q1) into a part attributable to changes in the sectoral composition of output and a part attributable to changes in the choice of technique in individual industries. These components can now be defined formally as follows.


Sectoral composition effect: The part of second-order difference in labour intensities in two periods (q2 - q1) that can be attributed to changes in the relative weights of industries with different degrees of labour intensities. 

Choice of technique effect: The part of second-order difference in labour intensities in two periods (q2 - q1) that can be attributed to changes in labour intensities within individual industries.


We shall first decompose L1 and L2 separately and then take their difference. We demonstrate below the method of decomposing only L1; the decomposition of L2 follows by symmetry. Let the individual industries in the manufacturing sectors be denoted by the subscript j. The following notations can now be used.

Wj10 = weight of industry j, i.e., the share of jth industry in total manufacturing output at the beginning of period 1.
Wj1T= 	weight of industry j, i.e., the share of jth industry in total manufacturing output at the end of period 1.
Lj10 = 	Labour-intensity of industry j, i.e., the employment-output ratio (E/Y) of jth industry at the beginning of period 1.
Lj1T = 	Labour-intensity of industry j, i.e., the employment-output ratio (E/Y) of jth industry at the end of period 1.
j1   =  Lj1T  Lj10 = Change in labour intensity in jth industry within period 1.
j1    =  Wj1T  Wj10 = Change in the weight of jth industry within period 1.
L10  = 	Aggregate labour-intensity (E/Y) of manufacturing as a whole at the beginning of period 1.




	L10 =  Wj10Lj10 						 (9a)




L1 =  L1T  L10  =  Wj1TLj1T – Wj10Lj10 			(10)

There are two alternative ways of expanding the expression (7). 

	L1 =  (Wj10 + j1)(Lj10 + j1) –  Wj10Lj10 			(11)
	L1 =  Wj1TLj1T – (Wj1T  j1)(Lj1T  j1)			(12)

Both are legitimate ways of expanding L1. The first method in (11) uses base year quantities (Wj10, Lj10) as weights while aggregating the industry specific values of j1 and j1 (as in Laspeyres’ index) and the second method in (12) uses the terminal year’s quantities as weights for the same purpose (as in the Paschee index). We have taken the average of both expansions so as to give due importance to both years’ weights, and the result, after some manipulation, turns out to be as follows.

	L1 = j1j1 + j1j1					(13)
where, j1 = (Wj1T+ Wj10)/2, and j1 = (Lj1T+ Lj10)/2		(14)

So,	q1 = L1/ L10 = (j1j1 + j1j1)/ L10			(15)

The first term of the RHS in (15) shows the part of the growth in aggregate labour-intensity in period 1 that can be attributed to change in labour-intensity within each sector (j1), i.e., to the change in the choice of technique, holding the sectoral weights j1 (i.e., composition) constant. It’s the ‘choice of technique effect’ for period 1. The second term shows the part that can be attributed to change in the weights of different industries (j1), holding the choice of techniques within each sector (j1) constant. It’s the sectoral composition effect for period 1.

Similarly, for period 2,

	L2 = j2j2 + j2j2					(16)
where, j2 = (Wj2T+ Wj20)/2, and j2 = (Lj2T+ Lj20)/2		(17)

So,	q2 = L2/ L20 = (j2j2 + j2j2)/ L20			(18)

The first and second terms of the RHS in (18) show respectively the ‘choice of technique effect’ and the ‘sectoral composition effect’ on the growth of labour intensity in period 2.

Finally, combining (15) and (18), the difference in growth rates of labour intensities in the two periods can be decomposed as follows,

	q2   q1 = (j2j2 + j2j2)/L20  (j1j1 + j1j1)/L10

Or, 	q2   q1 = 

	[j2j2/L20  j1j1/L10] + [j2j2/L20  j1j1/L10]	(19)

The first term in the RHS of (19) shows the part of the change in the growth rates of aggregate labour-intensity between two periods that can be attributed to change in the choice of technique (ji). The second term shows the part that can be attributed to change in the weights of different industries (ji). The first part is the choice of technique effect and the second part is the sectoral composition effect, which together account for the observed change in the growth rates of labour intensities between two periods. In proportionate terms, the decomposition of (q2   q1) can be expressed as:

Choice of technique effect:    [j2j2/L20  j1j1/L10]/(q2   q1)	(20a)
Sectoral composition effect:  [j2j2/L20  j1j1/L10]/(q2   q1)	(20b)


IV. Empirical Implementation of the Decomposition Analysis

In this section we demonstrate the potential usefulness of the kind of decomposition tools developed above by examining the growth of manufacturing employment in Asia. A recent study of ten major Asian countries (China, India, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Philippines, South Korea, Thailand and Sri Lanka), has found that manufacturing employment in the region as a whole experienced negative growth of -0.06 per cent per annum in the 1990s in contrast with a healthy growth of 3 per cent in the 1980s (Osmani, 2006). There was, however, some regional variation in this regard. Negative employment growth was observed in three out of ten countries – viz., China, Korea and the Philippines. It is the Chinese experience – a dramatic fall from 3 per cent growth in the 1980s to -1.7 per cent in the 1990s – that primarily accounts for the negative growth for Asia as a whole. The sub-region of South-East Asia (including Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines) maintained positive growth in the 1990s but at a much lower rate compared to the past. In South Asia (comprising India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka), by contrast, the growth rate accelerated slightly – from 1.5 per cent in the 1980s to 1.9 per cent in the following decade. This mild acceleration owed itself almost entirely to the developments in India, where employment growth recovered slightly in the 1990s from the sharp deceleration experienced in the 1980s. In Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, growth rate did not change much, whereas in Pakistan there was actually a deceleration in the 1990s compared to the preceding decade. The overall pattern is, therefore, one of weakening of employment growth in Asian manufacturing during 1990s.

The general trend of deceleration in employment growth in Asia seems to owe itself partly to deceleration in output growth and partly to falling elasticity of employment. In the ten countries taken together, the growth of manufacturing output fell from 11 per cent per annum in the 1980s to just below 9 per cent in the 1990s. The deceleration was shared by all the sub-regions – in China the growth rate fell from 14 per cent to 10.7 per cent, in South Asia from 7.8 per cent to 6.8 per cent and in South-East Asia from 9.9 per cent to 6.8 per cent. Given that the very high rates of growth of manufacturing output and employment observed in the earlier decades were achieved from a very low base, when Asia was just beginning to industrialise, it is not surprising that growth of output would taper off in subsequent decades. Correspondingly, one should also expect a tapering off of employment growth as well. This was compounded, however, by the effect of falling elasticity. For all ten countries combined, the value of elasticity declined from 0.28 in the 1980s to -0.06 in the 1990s. The most conspicuous cases of falling elasticity were China, Korea and the Philippines, where a positive elasticity in the 1980s turned negative in the 1990s. In South-East Asia, elasticity remained positive but declined from 0.70 in the 1970s to 0.55 in the 1980s and further to 0.28 in the 1990s. By contrast, in South Asia elasticity improved slightly from 0.19 in the 1980s to 0.28 in the 1990s, but it largely reflected a partial recovery from the sharp decline that had occurred in the preceding decade.

The decomposition method developed in this paper (in Section III) enables us to judge the relative importance of the two sources of change in employment growth – viz. output growth and elasticity. The analysis has been carried out separately for two time periods – one for the change between 1970s and 1980s and another for the change between 1980s and 1990s. Also, in each case the countries for which the required information was available are classified into two groups – those in which employment growth accelerated from one decade to the next and those in which employment growth decelerated.

Table 1 show that the elasticity effect dominated the output effect in accounting for the change in employment growth between 1970s and 1980s. Leaving out Sri Lanka, where employment growth changed very little, the elasticity effect was found to be dominant in four countries and the output effect in two. Moreover, the dominance of elasticity effect was found in both groups of countries – those experiencing acceleration and those experiencing deceleration in employment growth.

The dominance of elasticity effect is also observed between 1980s and 1990s (Table 2). This was especially true for the countries that experienced accelerating growth of employment. Indeed, it was only by virtue of rising elasticity that they were able to achieve acceleration in employment growth by offsetting a negative output effect. Out of the six countries in which employment growth decelerated, the importance of output and elasticity effects was equally shared. Output effect dominated in Bangladesh, Indonesia and Pakistan, while the elasticity effect dominated in China, Korea and the Philippines. Recall that the last three countries experienced the severest deceleration in employment growth in the 1990s, so much so that the absolute volume of manufacturing employment declined in each of these countries during this decade. It is interesting to note that falling elasticity accounted for almost the entire decline in employment growth in China and Korea and as much as three-fourths in the Philippines. Thus, the elasticity effect was the dominant factor both in countries enjoying acceleration in employment growth and in countries experiencing the severest deceleration.

The overall dominance of the elasticity effect in bringing about both acceleration and deceleration of employment growth brings to the fore the question of what are the underlying forces behind rising or falling elasticity in different countries. This question cannot be adequately answered without undertaking in-depth country-level analysis, which is beyond the scope of the present paper. The objective here is more to identify some general patterns that would help direct the attention of researchers to the right questions.

The concern with elasticity is ultimately a concern with the intensity of labour use in the production process. As noted in section III, however, elasticity does not capture the pure effect of labour-intensity as any change in the value of elasticity is influenced both by the change in labour-intensity and the change in output growth. Therefore, in order to meet the real concern with elasticity, we need to look specifically at the change in labour-intensity and the factors responsible for such change.

Table 3 presents decadal changes in labour-intensity in manufacturing employment in ten Asian countries. Clearly, falling labour-intensity is the norm in each of the three decades – 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. This is not surprising nor in itself disturbing since falling intensity implies rising labour productivity. Falling intensity, or, the other side of the coin, rising productivity, merely illustrates the operation of Verdoorn’s law discussed in section II. What matters more for the prospect of employment generation is whether the fall in labour-intensity is itself rising or falling over time and how fast. If the rate of decline in labour-intensity increases over time and does so at a fast pace in a newly industrialising country still brimming with surplus labour, that would indeed be a matter of serious concern from the point of view of generating pro-poor growth through employment creation. As noted in section III, it is this second-order difference (i.e., change of change) in labour-intensity that corresponds to the notion of elasticity effect for a given rate of output growth. Accordingly, we next look at the change of change in labour-intensity between decades.

It can be seen from Table 3 that the overall picture is not so bad when one considers inter-decade difference in the change in labour-intensity. Between 1970s and 1980s, improvement and deterioration was equally distributed, with four countries (Pakistan, Indonesia, Korea and Thailand) experiencing improvement in the sense that the rate of decline in labour-intensity fell in the 1980s compared to the 1970s, and four others experiencing deterioration (India, Sri Lanka, Malaysia and the Philippines). Between 1980s and 1990s, four countries experienced improvement (India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) and five suffered deterioration (Bangladesh, China, Korea and the Philippines). Philippines is the only country where the situation got systematically worse i.e., labour-intensity declined at an accelerating rate throughout the three decades, while Indonesia is the only country where the situation systematically improved in the sense that labour-intensity declined at a decelerating rate in a secular manner. 

In order to provide a basis for causal explanation of these diverse experiences (rather than the explanation itself), we have broken down the inter-decade difference in the change in labour-intensity into two components following the methodology developed in section III. The first component, called the ‘choice of technique effect’, takes into account the consequence of changing intensity of labour-use within specific industries. The second component, called the ‘sectoral composition effect’, refers to the contribution to overall change in labour-intensity that is made by the changing structure of industries i.e., by changes in the relative weights of industries with different degrees of labour-intensity. The decomposition formula 20(a) and 20(b) developed in section III are used for this purpose.​[12]​

Table 4 reports the change of change in labour-intensity between 1970s and 1980s and Table 5 does so for change of change between 1980s and 1990s. In both tables, the countries are classified into two groups. The first group comprises those in which labour-intensity can be said to have changed for the better in the sense that if labour-intensity was falling then it was falling at slower pace in the following decade and if it was rising then it was rising faster. Technically speaking, the second-order difference (i.e., the change of change) is positive for these countries. The second group comprises countries for which the second-order difference is negative. In these countries, the situation with labour-intensity has changed for the worse in the sense that if labour-intensity was falling then it was falling faster in the following decade and if it was rising then it was rising more slowly.

In interpreting these tables, what matters most is the sign of the values given for the two components – viz., choice of technique and sectoral composition. A positive sign indicates a positive contribution made by the particular component towards the second-order difference in overall labour-intensity between two decades. Positive contribution here means that it has helped to make things better i.e., either it has helped the overall labour-intensity to rise when it was rising faster in the second decade, or it has held back the decline when labour-intensity was falling faster in the second decade. In short, without this contribution labour-intensity would have either risen less slowly or fallen even faster. Exactly the opposite interpretation applies to the negative sign. It means that the component concerned has made things worse for labour-intensity – either making it rise more slowly or making it fall faster.

Considering first the change between 1970s and 1980s, several points are worth noting (Table 4). First, for both groups of countries – i.e., where things changed for the better as well as where things changed for the worse – sectoral composition usually made a positive contribution. With the exception of Thailand, in every other country for which we have data sectoral composition changed in a way that either helped labour-intensity to rise faster or helped contain its decline. This suggests that the structure of industries in most of the countries changed in such a way that the weight of more labour-intensive industries increased and the weight of less labour-intensive industries declined between 1970s and 1980s.

Second, for the first group of countries, in which things changed for the better, the improvement was brought about jointly by the choice of technique effect and the sectoral composition effect (with the exception of Thailand). The relative contribution of the two factors, however, differed across countries. In Korea and Thailand, the choice of technique was the dominant factor, while in Indonesia and Pakistan sectoral composition was the dominant factor.

Third, in the second group of countries, where things changed for the worse, choice of technique was entirely to blame. In each of the four countries in this group – viz, India, Malaysia, Philippines and Sri Lanka – the choice of technique made a negative contribution and in each case this negative effect was strong enough to outweigh the positive contribution made by sectoral composition. This suggests that wherever the situation with labour-intensity changed for the worse, it was solely because industries across the manufacturing sector adopted less labour-intensive methods of production.

The picture, however, changes dramatically when we consider the change between 1980s and 1990s (Table 5). First, unlike in the case of change between 1970s and 1980s, sectoral composition no longer had a benign effect. Its contribution was negative across the countries (with the exception of Bangladesh, where its contribution was nil), regardless of whether the overall situation with labour-intensity changed for the better or for the worse. In other words, the sectoral composition effect either held back the rise in labour-intensity or made it fall faster. The implication is that in all countries (except Bangladesh), the structure of the manufacturing sector changed in such a way that the weights of more labour-intensive industries declined and the weights of less labour-intensive industries increased.

Second, for the first group of countries, in which things changed for the better, the credit goes entirely to the choice of technique effect. In each of the countries of this group – viz, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan and Sri Lanka – industries across the manufacturing sector adopted more labour-intensive methods of production in the 1990s compared to the 1980s. This effect was strong enough to outweigh the adverse change in the composition of industries.

Third, for the second group of countries, where things changed for the worse, the general pattern is that both choice and technique and sectoral composition were responsible for making things worse. The relative importance of the two factors, however, differed across countries. In Korea, adverse change in sectoral composition was by far the main cause of deterioration in labour-intensity, in Bangladesh adoption of less labour-intensive of technique was the only cause, and in both China and the Philippines the choice of technique effect was marginally the more dominant cause.

The findings presented above provide an accounting framework for analysing the evolution of employment by isolating what might be called proximate determinants of employment and labour-intensity. A proper causal analysis will have to go beyond these proximate determinants and look for more fundamental causes. For instance, wherever the choice of technique effect dominates the sectoral composition effect or vice versa, one will have to ask why does it do so? Generally speaking, one will have to relate the decomposition analysis of the kind undertaken in this paper to developments in labour market, product markets, institutions and policies, in order to gain a proper understanding of why the employment scenario has changed in the way it has in a particular case. This requires in-depth country-level analysis that is beyond the scope of this paper. However, in order to illustrate the potential of this kind of analysis, we examine below the cases of Korea, China and India, drawing upon the existing literature but interpreting it in the light of our decomposition analysis.

We have noted above that Korea and China, along with the Philippines, are the only three countries in Asia that experienced absolute decline in manufacturing employment in the 1990s. In the case of Korea, this is perhaps not unexpected given the state of maturity its economy has attained. The history of the currently developed countries shows that in terms of structural change an economy seems to go through a two-stage transition as its economy matures. At the first stage, which is known as the Lewisian turning point, agriculture begins to lose labour force in absolute terms as manufacturing completes the process of absorbing surplus labour. At the second turning point, manufacturing itself beings to lose labour in absolute terms as the service sector becomes the mainstay of the economy. Korea already passed the first turning point in the late 1960s. By the 1990s, the Korean economy had matured enough to usher in the second turning point; as a result manufacturing employment declined in absolute terms. This process is reflected in steady decline in the elasticity of employment, which fell from 0.48 in the 1970s to 0.36 in the 1980s and then turned negative (-0.20) in the 1990s. The emergence of negative elasticity was a consequence of a sharp acceleration in the decline in labour-intensity in the manufacturing sector (Table 3). As can be seen from Table 5, the accelerating fall in labour-intensity was brought about exclusively by changing sectoral composition i.e., by increasing specialisation in more capital-intensive activities. This is entirely commensurate with the degree of sophistication and maturity that the Korean economy has attained in recent times. The decline in manufacturing employment in Korea can, therefore, be seen as a natural process of structural transformation of a mature economy.​[13]​

The same cannot be said, however, about China, which is still very much in the early stage of industrialisation and which still contains a good deal of surplus labour in its vast rural sector. What is happening in China has to be understood as the consequence of a dual transformation process i.e., two types of transformation that are taking place at the same time – a developmental transformation that has seen rapid industrialisation of an agrarian economy and a systemic transformation that has seen gradual conversion of a centrally planned economy into a market economy.​[14]​ The developmental process started in full swing with the rural reforms of the late 1970s; the systemic reform also started in agriculture at around the same time but took longer to take root elsewhere in the economy. It was only in the 1990s that the manufacturing sector started to feel the real impact of systemic transformation.

The two transformation processes are pulling manufacturing employment in two opposite directions. The developmental process is helping to raise manufacturing employment in the classical Lewisian fashion, absorbing surplus labour from agriculture. At the same time, however, the systemic process is putting a squeeze on employment by forcing the bloated state owned enterprises (SOEs) to shed redundant labour under forces of market competition and privatisation. The net effect on employment growth depends on the relative strengths of these two opposing forces.

In the 1980s, the systemic process had yet to take firm root in the manufacturing sector, which meant that the developmental process was the dominant force in that decade. As a result, manufacturing employment increased at a reasonable rate of around 3 per cent per annum in the 1980s. But the process of systemic transformation took over as the dominant force in the 1990s, especially in the second half of the decade, when shedding of excess labour in the SOEs became a widespread phenomenon.​[15]​ As a result, employment growth turned negative.​[16]​ 

The resulting fall in employment elasticity was the dominant factor in explaining the dismal employment performance in the 1990s (Table 2). Overall labour-intensity declined much faster in the 1990s compared to the 1980s (Table 3), and this happened partly because the SOEs shed excess labour without necessarily restricting output and partly because many SOEs, hoarding excess labour, contracted their scale of operation in relative terms as part of the process of rationalisation and privatisation. The first effect would be reflected in the choice of technique effect as defined in this paper and the second in the sectoral composition effect. The results of decomposition analysis presented in Table 5 indeed confirm that both these factors made substantial contribution towards the worsening of labour-intensity in the 1990s.

It should be noted, however, that one should be careful in interpreting the worsening of labour-intensity in China in view of its experience of the dual transformation process. To the extent that the labour force shed by the SOEs were really redundant, labour-intensity in terms of effective labour-hours may not have declined, at least not as much as it appears on paper, even though it may have declined in terms of human persons (Khan, 2001).

Finally, it is interesting to consider the implication of all this for poverty reduction in China. How does one reconcile poor performance in manufacturing employment with the roaring success that China has achieved in reducing poverty? Part of the answer is that employment performance was actually quite good during the phase in which poverty declined rapidly in China i.e. before 1990. The employment situation worsened only in the second half the 1990s, and during that period poverty reduction also slowed down. The causal connection between employment and poverty may not be straightforward, however, because many of those who lost employment in the SOEs may have found subsistence above the poverty line through absorption in the informal sector. However, to some extent the negative employment growth of the late 1990s may have played a role in slowing down the rate of poverty reduction that was occurring due to improvements in other sectors of the economy. It should be understood, though, that insofar as shedding of excess of labour by the SOEs is a once-for-all phenomenon, the negative role played by the manufacturing sector could well be a temporary aberration. Once the process of rationalisation nears completion, the developmental process could once again become the dominant force, aided and abetted by the opening up of China’s economy and its export drive. Rapid employment growth in manufacturing could then once again play its due role in reducing poverty, as it did in the 1980s. 

Finally, we turn to India, which in stark contrast to China had seen a drastic slowdown in employment growth in the 1980s but recovered slightly in the 1990s. India is also the most important Asian country to have bucked the trend of falling elasticity in the 1990s. The elasticity of employment in the manufacturing sector had actually fallen quite drastically in the 1980s – to just 0.07 from the height of 0.59 attained in the 1970s. The 1990s, however, saw a modest improvement as elasticity climbed to 0.10. Modest as it is, it is the elasticity effect that was the dominant factor in explaining the slight acceleration in employment growth that was observed in the 1990s compared to the 1980s (Table 2).

A sizeable literature has grown up trying to explain why the rate of employment decelerated in the 1980s and then accelerated in the 1990s.​[17]​Alternative hypotheses have been offered and contested. Our findings can throw some light on the relative plausibility of these hypotheses.

Most of the hypotheses have focussed on the phenomenon of falling elasticity and the concomitant decline in labour-intensity in the 1980s. One of the hypotheses suggests that the travails of the 1980s came mainly from mill closures and other problems faced by the food and beverage industries, by far the biggest employer in Indian manufacturing. If this explanation were valid, one would expect to find the sectoral composition effect to be the major force behind the worsening of labour-intensity in the 1980s. But in fact the opposite is true – the main negative force came from the choice of technique effect, while sectoral composition actually played a mildly positive role (Table 4). 

A second hypothesis states that tightening of labour market regulations in the late 1970s and early 1980s persuaded employers to reduce labour-intensity of production. A third, closely related, hypothesis argues that higher real wages obtained through trade union pressure led to reduced labour-intensity. Both these hypotheses are consistent with our finding that overall labour-intensity of the manufacturing sector worsened in the 1980s mainly because of the adoption of less labour-intensive techniques across the industries. However, a number of studies show that neither of them can stand the scrutiny when judged against several other types of evidence.​[18]​

A final hypothesis that has gained some popularity and is also consistent with our findings makes a distinction between labour-time and labourers, the same distinction that was also relevant, as we have seen, in the context of China in the 1990s. The argument starts with the premise that considerable labour hoarding took place in the 1970s as employment growth outpaced output growth by a large margin. The value of elasticity that emerged from this process was very impressive (0.59), but it has been argued that this reflected high degree labour intensity only in terms of labourers but not in terms of labour-hours. In other words, many of those who got absorbed in manufacturing ended up sharing work with others, resulting in widespread underemployment. The evidence that the rapid employment growth of 1970s was more in the nature of underemployment came in the 1980s, when hours worked per person increased, equivalent to almost one working day a week (Bhalotra 1998).

The combination of poor infrastructure and restrictive labour laws has been advanced as an explanation of why labour hoarding occurred in the 1970s. Poor infrastructure (such as disruption in power supply) resulted in reduced output but labour could not be retrenched in response to loss of output because of restrictive labour laws. The result was work-sharing and underemployment. As investment in infrastructure improved in the 1980s, output could be increased by utilising the existing labour force more intensively. This was a major reason why employment growth lagged behind output growth in the 1980s. It has also been argued that further tightening of the labour laws coupled with some reforms that induced more competition in the product markets in the early 1980s gave further inducement to employers to squeeze out the extra hours from existing workers instead of employing new ones. Labour intensity, measured in terms of labourers, declined as a result, although it may have increased in terms of labour-hours. 

In terms of our decomposition analysis, this hypothesis implies that the main impetus for reduced overall labour-intensity in manufacturing in the 1980s would come from the choice of technique effect rather than the sectoral composition effect, as employers across the board squeeze out extra hours from existing workers in order to produce extra output. This is confirmed by the results reported in Table 4 – the choice of technique effect was indeed the dominant factor in inducing worsening of labour-intensity between 1970s and 1980s.






This paper had two inter-related objectives. The first objective was to clarify some conceptual issues about the linkages among output growth, employment growth and poverty and in the process to point out some potential pitfalls in using the notion of employment elasticity of growth. In particular, it was pointed out that even though the underlying motivation behind using the elasticity measure is to throw some light on the extent to which a particular growth process was able to generate demand for labour absorption, in practice such measures often failed to do so. The problem is not merely an empirical one of not being able to use the right kind of data. The more fundamental problem lies at the conceptual level involving some potential ambiguities in interpreting the measure. 

This led to the second objective – namely, to develop a methodology that would clearly isolate the employment orientation of the growth process. To this end, a two-step decomposition methodology was developed. In the first step, the change in employment growth between any two time periods is broken up into an output effect and an elasticity effect. The former is meant to capture the effect of output growth on employment and the latter is meant to capture the effect of changes in labour-intensity of production. The second-stage decomposition exercise breaks up the change in overall labour-intensity of the production process into two components – one of them captures the effect of change in the sectoral composition of output and the other captures the effects of changes in the choice of technique in individual activities.


















Breakdown of Employment Growth into
Output Effect and Elasticity Effect: 1970s-1980s


	Acceleration/Deceleration(percentage points)	Output effect(per cent)	Elasticity effect(per cent)
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Countries with Accelerating Employment Growth 			
     Indonesia	4.94	39	61
     Pakistan	2.03	-34	134
     Sri Lanka	0.12	615	-515
			
Countries with Decelerating Employment Growth			
     India	-3.11	3	-103
     Korea	-5.92	-61	-39
     Malaysia	-6.20	-5	-95
     Philippines	-8.19	-60	-40
			

Source: Computed by the author from UNIDO Database INDSTAT3 Rev2.
Notes: 
(1) Column (1) refers to the acceleration/deceleration (measured in percentage points) in the annual compound rates of growth of manufacturing employment from one decade to the next.
(2) Column (2) shows the percentage of the acceleration/deceleration given in column (1) that can be attributed to acceleration/deceleration in output growth.














Breakdown of Employment Growth into
Output Effect and Elasticity Effect: 1980s-1990s


	Acceleration/Deceleration(percentage points)	Output effect(per cent)	Elasticity effect(per cent)
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Accelerating EmploymentGrowth Countries			
      India	0.21	-29	129
      Malaysia	0.44	-119	219
      Sri Lanka	0.46	-676	776
			
Decelerating EmploymentGrowth Countries			
     Bangladesh	-3.47	-90	-10
     China	-7.15	2	-102
     Indonesia	-6.17	-87	-13
     Korea	-5.26	10	-110
     Pakistan	-0.94	-203	103
     Philippines	-1.57	-24	-76
			

Source: Computed by the author from UNIDO Database INDSTAT3 Rev2.
Notes: 
(1) The definition of the 1990s varies somewhat across the countries as data for the same terminal year were not available for all countries. Moreover, this definition also varies in some cases from the definition used in Tables 1-4 for reasons explained in Section IV of the text.
(2) Column (1) refers to the acceleration/deceleration (measured in percentage points) in the annual compound rates of growth of manufacturing employment from one decade to the next.
(3) Column (2) shows the percentage of the acceleration/deceleration given in column (1) that can be attributed to acceleration/deceleration in output growth.














Change in Labour Intensity: 1970s-1990s














	Philippines	  6.2	 -4.4	-26.4
     	Thailand	-14.4	  4.0	---
				

Source: Computed by the author from UNIDO Database INDSTAT3 Rev2.













Breakdown of Elasticity Effect into
Sectoral Composition Effect and Choice of Technique Effect: 1970s-1980s


	Choice of Technique effect	Sectoral Composition effect
	(1)	(2)
Countries with positive second-order change in labour-intensity		
     Thailand	352	-252
     Indonesia	 39	  61
     Korea	 55	  45
     Pakistan	 19	  81
		
Countries with negative second-order change in labour-intensity		
     India	-131	  31
     Malaysia	-122	  22
     Philippines	-120	  20
     Sri Lanka	-867	767
		

Source: Computed by the author from UNIDO Database INDSTAT3.
Notes: 
(1) The definition of the 1990s varies somewhat across the countries as data for the same terminal year were not available for all countries. Moreover, this definition also varies in some cases from the definition used in Tables 1-4 for reasons explained in Section IV of the text.
(2) Second-order change in labour-intensity refers to the change of change in labour-intensity between two decades. Thus the difference between columns (2) and (1) in Table 7 gives the second-order difference between 1970s and 1980s.
(3) Column (1) shows the percentage of second-order change of overall labour-intensity between decades that can be attributed to the change in labour-intensity within specific industries.













Breakdown of Elasticity Effect into
Sectoral Composition Effect and Choice of Technique Effect: 1980s-1990s


	Choice of Technique effect	Sectoral Composition effect
	(1)	(2)
Countries with positive second-order change in labour-intensity		
     India	144	  -44
     Indonesia	155	  -55
     Malaysia	293	-193
     Pakistan	109	   -9
     Sri Lanka	197	-197
		
Countries with negative second-order change in labour-intensity		
     Bangladesh	-100	    0
     China	 -55	 -45
     Korea	   7	-107
     Philippines	-57	 -43
		

Source: Computed by the author from UNIDO Database INDSTAT3.
Notes: 
(1) The definition of the 1990s varies somewhat across the countries as data for the same terminal year were not available for all countries. Moreover, this definition also varies in some cases from the definition used in Tables 1-4 for reasons explained in Section IV of the text.
(2) Second-order change in labour-intensity refers to the change of change in labour-intensity between two decades. Thus the difference between columns (3) and (2) in Table 7 gives the second-order difference between 1980s and 1990s.
(3) Column (1) shows the percentage of second-order change of overall labour-intensity between decades that can be attributed to the change in labour-intensity within specific industries.







Bhalotra, S. R. (1998), “The Puzzle of Jobless Growth in Indian Manufacturing”, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 60(1).
Ghose, A. (2004), “Employment Challenges for India”, Economic and Political Weekly, November 27.
Ghosh, J. (2004), “Macroeconomic Policy Reforms and a Labour Market Policy Framework for India”, Employment Strategy Policy Paper 2004/1, Employment Strategy Department, International Labour Office: Geneva.
Goldar, B. (2000), “Employment Growth in Organised Manufacturing in India”, Economic and Political Weekly, 35(4), April 1-7.
Islam, R. (2001), “The Employment Challenge Facing China”, paper presented at a Seminar on Poverty Reduction and Informal Sector Employment in China, held in Shanghai on 27-29 June. Recovery and Reconstruction Department, International Labour Office: Geneva.
Islam, R. (2003), “Labour Market Policies, Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction: Lessons and Non-lessons from the Comparative Experience of East, South-East and South Asia”, Issues in Employment and Poverty Discussion Paper 8. Recovery and Reconstruction Department, International Labour Office: Geneva.
Kapsos, S. (2005), “The Employment Intensity of Growth: Trends and Macroeconomic Determinants”, (mimeo.) Employment Strategy Department, International Labour Office: Geneva.
Khan, A. R. (2001), “Employment Policies for Poverty Reduction”, Issues in Employment and Poverty Discussion Paper 1. Recovery and Reconstruction Department, International Labour Office: Geneva.
Lucas, R. E. B. (1988), “India’s Industrial Policy”, in Robert E B Lucas and Gustav Papanek (eds), The Indian Economy: Recent Developments and Future Prospects, Oxford University Press, Delhi.
Mamgain, V. (1999), “Are the Kaldor-Verdoorn Laws Applicable in the Newly Industrializing Countries?”, Review of Development Economics, 3(3).
Mazumdar, D. (2003), “Trends in Employment and the Employment Elasticity in Manufacturing, 1971-92: An International Comparison”, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 27(4).
Nagaraj, R. (1994), “Employment and Wages in Manufacturing Industries: Trends, Hypotheses and Evidence”, Economic and Political Weekly, 29(4), January 22.
Nagaraj, R. (2000), “Organised Manufacturing Employment”, Economic and Political Weekly, September 16.
Osmani, S. R. (2006), “Employment Intensity of Asian Manufacturing: An Examination of Recent Trends.” (Mimeo.) Paper prepared for the Asian Regional Bureau of the United Nations Development Programme: New York.
Sachs, J. and Woo, W. T. (1994), “Structural Factors in the Economic Reforms of China, Eastern, Europe, and the former Soviet Union," Economic Policy, April, Vol. 18, pp.101-145.
Sundaram, K. (2001), “The Employment-Unemployment Situation in India in the Nineteen Nineties”, Economic and Political Weekly, March 17.









^1	  See, for example, Khan (2001), Islam (2003), Mazumdar (2003), and Kapsos (2005). 
^2	  Strictly speaking, there is one theoretical exception to this argument. This occurs when the supply of labour is endogenous to the growth process. If it can be shown that the supply of labour is determined endogenously by the effects of the growth process on the rate of population growth and the rate of labour force participation, then no meaningful distinction can be made between the supply side and the demand side for labour for the economy as a whole. The overall employment elasticity, as typically measured, will then correctly reveal the employment-generating power of the growth process, taking into account its effects on both demand and supply. In practice, however, the time frame within which supply of labour can be deemed to be endogenous to the growth process is very much longer than the time periods over which elasticity estimates are typically calculated. For such short periods, the supply of labour has to be taken to be independent of the growth process, and that’s why the effect of supply side must be separated out if the elasticity estimates are to shed any light on the employment-friendliness of the growth process. 
^3	  Technically speaking, the observed elasticity would still be a ‘reduced form’ estimate, combining the effects of supply and demand. However, the fact that the supply curve is horizontal (and fixed at a given wage rate) helps to ‘identify’ the observed value as an estimate of the ‘structural parameter’ of the labour demand function originating from the growth process. 
^4	  In practice, the supply curve may not be perfectly horizontal due to various kinds of market imperfection. In that case, the elasticity estimate will be somewhat ‘contaminated’ by the supply side effect. However, so long as the supply curve is close to horizontal, the observed elasticity estimate can be taken as a rough approximation of the demand for labour generated by the growth process.
^5	  For a recent review of the literature, see Mamgain (1999).
^6	  It will be argued below that something like this may actually be happening in China in recent years.
^7	  Defining the elasticity effect in this way may seem to go counter to the argument made in Section II that when Verdoorn’s law operates it might be misleading to draw inference about the employment-friendliness of growth merely by observing the elasticity alone, but actually it doesn’t. One can still calculate the elasticity effect when the Verdoorn’s law operates, but the argument made in Section II entails that one must be careful in interpreting it. 
^8	  What precisely is meant by a ‘corresponding change’ is discussed briefly below and explained at length in the Technical Appendix of Osmani (2006), which explores the exact nature of the relationship between elasticity and labour-intensity.
^9	  Technically, the choice of technique effect reflects the consequence of movement along the isoquant.
^10	  Note that on this interpretation an observed change in elasticity tells us something only about the change in the rate of change of labour intensity and not about the change in labour intensity as such. In particular, contrary to common perception, falling elasticity does not necessarily entail falling labour intensity nor does falling labour intensity necessarily entail falling elasticity. These points are discussed more fully in the Technical Appendix of Osmani (2006). There we also discuss how to interpret falling or rising elasticity in terms of labour intensity under alternative scenario of whether the given output growth is positive or negative and whether the value of elasticity happens to be more or less than unity. We show that considering all possible scenario, falling elasticity does indicate unfavourable movement in labour intensity and rising elasticity does indicate a favourable movement, but this movement has to be interpreted as a second-order change (i.e., change in the rate of change) rather than first-order change in labour-intensity.
^11	  We do this for the simple reason that dealing with labour-intensities is algebraically much more convenient than dealing with elasticities.
^12	  Ideally, one should use data at a very high level of disaggregation so as to isolate the choice of technique effect from sectoral composition effect, because as data get more aggregated the choice of technique effect is likely to capture some sectoral composition effect as well. However, the UNIDO database used in this study allows only 3-digit and 4-digit levels of disaggregation, and the latter is available only for a shorter period of time. We were, therefore, obliged to use 3-digit data (INDSTAT3 Rev.2), which is not entirely satisfactory for our purpose. We hope that future researchers would be able to use more disaggregated data obtained from national statistical sources.
^13	  The magnitude of the decline may have been exacerbated somewhat by the financial crisis of the late 1990s and a slowdown in the rate of output growth compared to the preceding decades.
^14	  See Sachs and Woo (1994) and Woo and Ren (2002) for elaboration of this dual transformation process. The puzzle of China’s employment situation is also discussed in Islam (2001) and Khan (2001).
^15	  Over the period 1995-2000 some 12 million staff and workers were retrenched by the SOEs, a number that exceeded the 4 million new workers engaged (mostly on contract basis) by the expanding industries, resulting in a fall in total manufacturing employment of 18 per cent. The overall outcome was that manufacturing employment in 2000 remained the same as it had been in 1986.  (Woo and Ren, 2002, p.9)
^16	  The problem was further aggravated by the Asian financial crisis and the adoption of an austerity programme in the mid-1990s for restoring macroeconomic stability.
^17	  For some important contributions to this literature, see inter alia, Lucas (1988), Nagaraj (1994, 2000), Bhalotra (1998) and Goldar (2000).
^18	  See the review of the relevant findings in Bhalotra (1998) and Goldar (2000).
